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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper defines adversarial reasoning as computational approaches to inferring and anticipating an enemy's 
perceptions, intents and actions. It argues that adversarial reasoning transcends the boundaries of game theory 
and must also leverage such disciplines as cognitive modeling, control theory, AI planning and others. To 
illustrate the challenges of applying adversarial reasoning to real-world problems, the paper explores the lessons 
learned in the CADET -- a battle planning system that focuses on brigade-level ground operations and involves 
adversarial reasoning. From this example of current capabilities, the paper proceeds to describe RAID -- a 
DARPA program that aims to build capabilities in adversarial reasoning, and how such capabilities would 
address practical requirements in Defense and other application areas. 
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1.  THE SCOPE OF ADVERSARIAL REASONING 
 
This paper focuses on approaches and challenges in what is loosely encompassed by the term adversarial reasoning: 
computational solutions to determining the states, intents and actions of one's adversary, in an environment where one 
strives to effectively counter the adversary's actions.  
 
The subtopics within this subject include belief and intent recognition, opponent's strategy prediction, plan recognition, 
deception discovery, deception planning, and strategy generation. From the engineering perspective, the applications of 
adversarial reasoning cover a broad range of practical problems: military planning and command, military and foreign 
intelligence, anti-terrorism and domestic security, law enforcement, information security, recreational strategy games, 
simulation and training systems, applied robotics, etc. 
 
To make the term adversarial reasoning more concrete, consider the domain where it has been applied particularly 
extensively, the domain of military operations. In military command and control, the challenge of automating the 
reasoning about the intents, plans and actions of the adversary would involve the development of computational means 
to reason about the future enemy actions in a way that combines: the enemy's intelligent plans to achieve his objectives 
by effective use of his strengths and opportunities; the enemy's perception of friendly strengths, weaknesses and intents; 
the enemy's tactics, doctrine, training, moral, cultural and other biases and preferences; the impact of terrain, 
environment (including noncombatant population), weather, time and space available; the influence of personnel 
attrition, ammunition and other consumable supplies, logistics, communications, sensors and other elements of a 
military operation; and the complex interplay and mutual dependency of friendly and enemy actions, reactions and 
counteractions that unfold during the execution of the operation. Adversarial reasoning is the process of making 
inferences over the totality of the above factors. 
 
Although many of the problems inherent in adversarial reasoning have been traditionally seen as belonging to the field 
of game theory, we argue here that practical adversarial reasoning calls for a broader range of disciplines: artificial 
intelligence planning, cognitive modeling, game theory, robust control theory, machine learning.  An effective approach 
to the problems of adversarial reasoning must combine contributions from disciplines that unfortunately rarely come 
together. One of our objectives here is to demonstrate the important close relations between ideas coming from such 
diverse areas. 
 
Three themes are particularly salient in adversarial reasoning. Faced with an intelligent adversary, a decision maker, 
whether human or computational, often must begin by using the available information in order to identify the intent, the 
nature and the probable plans of the adversary. Hence the first key theme of adversarial reasoning – opponent’s intent 
and plan recognition. However, a capable adversary is likely to conceal his plans and to introduce crucial deceptions. 
Therefore, the second theme – deception discovery – focuses on detection of concealments and deceptions. Having 
made progress in identifying an adversary's intent and guarding himself against possible deceptions, the decision maker 
has to formulate his own plan of actions that takes into account potential counteractions of the adversary - and this is the 
third theme, strategy formulation. 
 
2.  PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSARIAL REASONING 
 
There are several reasons why research on adversarial reasoning is of practical interest at this time.  The post-9/11 
security posture of the United States fuels investments and growing interest in innovative computational techniques 
suitable for practical applications in military intelligence, military robotics, counter-terrorism, law enforcement and 
information security. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently initiated a 
program in adversarial reasoning (called RAID [4]).  
 
On the other hand, recent years have seen a dramatic rise in the capabilities of techniques relevant to adversarial 
reasoning, making potential solutions for the first time relevant to problems of a practical scale and complexity. The 
1950's and 1960's saw critical developments in the understanding of Game Theory, a key element of adversarial 
reasoning. Game problems are tremendously more complex than those for systems without antagonistic inputs. Until 
recently, game formulations of practical problems, with the attendant level of detail and scale, resulted in a level of 
complexity that could not be satisfactorily handled. Today, however, there are claims of computational techniques that 
offer the promise of robustness and scalability appropriate for practical applications. Furthermore, there has been a 
dramatic rise in the maturity of technical approaches that address the cognitive aspects of adversarial reasoning, 
particularly the means to model how an adversary perceives a situation, reflects on what the opponent might perceive 
and do, and decides on a course of action.   
 
The applied communities interested in adversarial reasoning certainly include military planners and analysts as well as 
the intelligence community. Those who develop applications and processes related to anti-terrorism and domestic 
security and law enforcement would share similar interests. Other, less obvious communities of practitioners include 
those concerned with financial fraud detection and information security. They also benefit from a better understanding 
of what and how the opponent thinks while preparing and executing a financial fraud or an intrusion into an information 
system. Developers of military simulation and training systems, as well as developers of commercial entertainment 
games, are always striving for a more realistic and intelligent opposing force within their respective systems. To a 
significant extent, they benefit from advances in adversarial reasoning. Finally, an even less obvious, but very relevant, 
area of practical applications is military robotics. In order to survive and be effective in a hostile environment, a robot 
(e.g., a highly autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle) must reason about the likely actions of its adversaries. 
 
3.  THE CADET - AN EXPLORATION IN ADVERSARIAL REASONING 
 
One way to identify the challenges of adversarial reasoning is to look at an example of a system that requires and 
exhibits some elements of such reasoning. Here, for this purpose, we use the example of the Course of Action 
Development and Evaluation Tool (CADET), a system for semi-automated planning of US Army ground operations. 
Although the CADET has been discussed elsewhere in greater detail [6, 10-12], in this paper we particularly focus on 
those elements of the CADET that highlight the challenges of adversarial reasoning. 
 
The CADET is a tool for automatically (or with human guidance) producing the detailed tasks required to translate a 
basic concept into a fully formed, actionable plan, which is a key step in the military’s standard decision making 
process.  This step involves taking the course of action for the friendly forces, developed in a previous step and initially 
expressed as a high-level concept, and expanding it into the hundreds of supporting tasks required to accomplish the 
intended objective.  Crucially, it also involves estimating the reactions of the enemy, and planning appropriate 
counteractions. Thus, it requires adversarial reasoning.  
  
The input for this effort usually comes 
from the unit Commander in the form of 
two doctrinally defined products: a 
Course of Action (COA) sketch (e.g., 
Fig. 1) and a Course of Action statement 
– a high-level textual specification of the 
operation. In effect, such a sketch and 
statement comprise a set of high-level 
actions, goals, and sequencing, referring 
largely to movements and objectives of 
the friendly forces, e.g., “Task Force 
Arrow attacks along axis Bull to 
complete the destruction of the 2nd Red 
Battalion.”   
 
The outcome of the process is usually 
recorded in a synchronization matrix [8], 
a type of Gantt chart. Time periods 
constitute the columns. Functional 
classes of actions, such as maneuver, 
logistics, military intelligence, etc., are 
the rows (see Fig. 2). The content of this 
plan, recorded largely in the matrix cells, includes the tasks and actions of the multiple subunits and assets of the 
friendly force; their objectives and manner of execution, expected timing, dependencies and synchronization; routes and 
locations; availability of supplies, combat losses, enemy situation and actions.  
 
The manual process of generating this 
product is complex, error-prone and time-
consuming. The CADET assists military 
planners in this process by rapidly translating 
an initial, high-level COA into a detailed 
battle plan and wargaming the plan to 
determine if it is feasible.  Working with the 
planner in a series of user/computer 
interactions, the system details resources, 
schedules, elaborates, and analyzes the COA. 
 
In brief, the human planner defines the high-
level COA via a user interface that enables 
him to enter the information comparable to 
the conventional COA sketch and statement 
(e.g., Fig. 1), which the COA-entry interface 
then transforms into an input to the CADET 
proper, a collection of formal assertions 
and/or objects, including typically on the 
order of 2-20 high-level tasks. This 
definition of the COA is transferred to the 
CADET, which proceeds to expand this 
high-level specification into a detailed 
plan/schedule of the operation.  
Figure 1:  An example of a (partial) sketch of a course of action. 
Figure 2:  An example synchronization matrix (partial) produced in a 
planning and wargaming process, starting with the COA sketch of 
Fig.1and COA statement. Such products are usually drawn by hand on a 
preprinted template of a synchronization matrix. More recently, these are 
are commonly produced with a personal computer, using conventional 
programs for office presentation graphics and spreadsheets. 
 Within this expansion process, the CADET decomposes friendly tasks into more detailed actions; determines the 
necessary supporting relations, allocates / schedules tasks to friendly assets; takes into account dependencies between 
tasks and availability of assets; estimates enemy actions and reactions; devises friendly counter-actions; and estimates 
paths of movements, timing requirements, force attrition and supply consumption. The resulting detailed, scheduled and 
wargamed plan often consists of up to 500 detailed actions with a wealth of supporting detail.  
 
Having completed this process (largely automatically, in about 20 seconds on a typical laptop computer), the CADET 
displays the results to the user as a synchronization matrix and/or as animated movements on the map-based interface. 
The user then reviews the results and may either change the original specification of the COA or directly edit the 
detailed plan.   
 
The technical core of the CADET is an algorithm [10] for tightly interleaved incremental planning, routing, time 
estimating, scheduling (partly similar to [11]), estimates of attrition [12] and consumption, and adversarial reaction 
estimation. This interleaving approach descends conceptually from a tree solver [9] where similar interleaving is applied 
to a design domain. Here we will focus on the particular technique within the overall algorithm that focuses specifically 
on elements of adversarial reasoning.  
  
The CADET accounts for adversarial activity in several ways. First, it allows the commander and staff to specify the 
likely actions of the enemy. The automated planning then proceeds, taking into account, in parallel, both the friendly 
and enemy actions. Further, the CADET automatically infers (using its knowledge base and using the same expansion 
technique used for hierarchical task network planning) possible reactions and counteractions, and provides for resources 
and timing necessary to incorporate them into the overall plan.  We adopted the Action-Reaction-Counteraction (ARC) 
heuristic technique used in the traditional COA analysis phase of the Military Decision Making Process [8]. In the 
Action-Reaction-Counteraction (ARC) approach, an action possible by either friendly or enemy warrants examination 
for potential reactions.  This is followed with further analysis to determine if there exists a counter-action that can be 
used to minimize the impact of the reaction or negate its effects completely. The ARC technique was augmented with 
parallel planning for both friendly and enemy forces.  
 
Consider the example of the activity called "forward passage of lines," in which a unit of force passes through the lines 
of defense manned by a friendly unit and then engages the enemy. When performing this activity, both the unit being 
passed, and the passing unit, are susceptible to enemy artillery fire. Therefore, the CADET's knowledge base includes a 
method that, in the process of expanding this activity, postulates that if the enemy has suitable forces, it will react by 
attacking by fire the passing unit.  The method searches for enemy artillery units within the range from the location of 
the passage of lines, and creates the (hypothetic) enemy reaction activity "artillery fire" performed by the available 
enemy unit.  This in turn triggers the generation of counteraction activities.  
 
ARC does not involve an explicit search, in the sense that it does not explicitly explore multiple alternative moves at 
each decision point, and it does not involve backtracking, except for the user-driven backtracking. Instead, the process 
proceeds in a linear, depth-first fashion: for every newly generated action, the ARC method of the activity (if one is 
specified within the KB) produces an activity (or activities) representing the enemy reaction; the reaction activity in turn 
triggers a similar generation of counteraction activities.   
  
The ARC process does not look for an optimal solution and does not guarantee one. Rather, the intent is to produce a 
solution that is consistent with the user’s expectations and doctrinal training and is produced much faster and more 
accurately than in the manual process. Although ARC does not guarantee optimality, it produces solutions of the quality 
that experts find comparable to those of human experts. The rules that generate reactions and counteractions embody 
expert knowledge. The probability of generating a grossly suboptimal solution is minimized because the rules that 
generate a reaction do implicitly account for probable counteractions. 
 
To evaluate the products of the CADET, we performed several series of Turing-test-like experiments [6]. In one of the 
experimental series,  qualified human judges were asked to review two sets of battle plans: one set was generated by US 
Army officers during training exercises and another set was generated (for the same battle scenarios) by the CADET. 
The plans were disguised in a way that prevented the judges from knowing which were generated by humans and which 
were generated by the CADET. The objective was a “blind test” of whether there is a detectable difference between the 
human-generated and the CADET-generated plans. The experiment involved five different scenarios of Brigade-sized 
offensive operations, nine judges (all Army or Marine field grade officers - Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels or Majors - 
mostly active duty), four types of planning products for each scenario, and three individual grades that the judges were 
asked to assign to the products.  
 
Each judge was asked to review a plan (presented as a synchronization matrix) and to provide 3 grades: one grade that 
characterizes the correctness and feasibility of the plan as reflected in the synchronization matrix, on the scale of 1-10; 
one grade that characterizes the completeness and thoroughness of the plan as reflected in the synchronization matrix, 
on the scale of 1-10; and one qualitative grade that compares the plan with typical products they see in today’s Army 
practice (ranging from “much worse” to “much better”). Instructions to the judges were worded in a way that associated 
the grade of 5 with the "typical quality found in today's practice." 
 
Overall, the results demonstrated that the CADET performed on par with the human staff - the difference between the 
CADET’s and a human’s performance was statistically insignificant. Taking the mean of the grades for all five 
scenarios, the CADET earned 4.2, and humans earned 4.4, with standard deviation of about 2.0, a very insignificant 
difference. However, it typically takes a human staff about 16 person-hours to produce a plan, while the CADET 
assisted user spends only about 0.4 person-hours per plan. The conclusion: the CADET helped produce complex 
planning products dramatically faster (almost two orders of magnitude faster) yet without loss of quality, as compared 
to the conventional, manual process. 
 
From the perspective of adversarial reasoning, the judges never felt that the CADET was insufficiently mindful of the 
adversary. Overall, the ARC technique produced battle plans that look to human reviewers rather sophisticated, 
insightful and proactive: they seemed to anticipate and parry enemy actions multiple “moves” ahead, even though in 
fact the ARC technique does not involve any look-ahead reasoning.  
 
So much for the strong points of the CADET, now let us take a look at its shortcomings.  First, the CADET has no 
mechanism for explicit look ahead, for wargaming or game-solving in any sense. Although the CADET-generated plans 
seem to anticipate enemy actions and do detailed preparations for such actions far in advance, it is largely an illusion. 
The CADET plans backwards from the key events pre-defined in the human-generated high-level course of action. 
Unlike humans, the CADET does not attempt to invent (even in a limited sense) the strategy of the battle. It merely fills 
in the details (albeit important and complicated) into the outline of an adversarial encounter envisioned by the human. 
While acceptable in some applications, this shortcoming may not be in many others. Further, much of warfare is based 
on deception and concealment. Nothing in the CADET explicitly reasons about such issues. 
 
The CADET also has no means to take into account the emotional and cognitive aspects of the battle. Real human 
warriors, at all levels of responsibility, have beliefs, emotions, desires, biases, preferences, etc., that contribute much to 
their plans and actions. These aspects are complex, and they change dynamically as the battle unfolds. The CADET 
does not reason on such factors. It also does not take into account the inevitable errors and cognitive limitations of the 
humans in real-world warfare.  
 
Finally, the CADET does not take into consideration a very important factor: the impact of decision-making processes 
and organizations on the enemy (and friendly) actions. There are complex and influential dynamics in command 
decision-making, in communications, in the propagation of uncertainty, errors, confusion, trust and fears through the 
formal and informal network of leaders of multiple units and echelons. The problem becomes even more complex when 
broader, non-military societal concerns and phenomena – political, financial, ideological, etc. – must be taken into 
account [13]. All of this is outside the CADET's scope.  
 
The CADET, of course, is not alone in suffering from such shortcomings. It merely indicates the state of the art in 
practical adversarial reasoning. 
 
4.  RAID – THE NEAR-TERM FUTURE OF ADVERSARIAL REASONING 
 
If the best of today’s capabilities is exemplified by tools like the CADET, the near-future may be defined by the 
ongoing DARPA program called RAID.  Started in the fall of 2004, the Real-time Adversarial Intelligence and 
Decision-making (RAID) program focuses on the challenge of anticipating enemy actions in a military operation. In a 
number of recent publications, US military leaders call for the development of techniques and tools to address this 
critical challenge.  
 
The US Air Force community uses the term predictive battlespace awareness [1-2] while a related term, predictive 
analysis, is beginning to be used in the US Army community [3]. Both refer to future techniques and technologies that 
would help the commander and staff to characterize and predict likely enemy courses of action, to relate the history of 
the enemy’s performance to its current and future actions, and to associate these predictions with opportunities for 
friendly actions and effects. Both communities have pointed out the lack of technologies, techniques and tools to 
support predictive analysis and predictive battlespace awareness. 
 
The RAID program aims to produce key technologies for tools capable of in-execution predictive analysis of an 
enemy’s probable actions. A particular focus of the program will be tactical urban operations against irregular 
combatants (Fig. 3) – an especially challenging and operationally relevant domain. 
 
The program intends to leverage novel approximate game-theoretic, deception-sensitive algorithms and cognitive 
modeling to provide real-time enemy estimates to a tactical commander. In doing so, the RAID program will address 
two critical technical challenges: (a) Adversarial Reasoning: the ability to continuously identify and update predictions 
of likely enemy actions; and (b) Deception Reasoning: the ability to continuously detect likely deceptions in the 
available battlefield information (Fig. 4). 
Figure 3:  One possible application of RAID is a component within the future military intelligence 
systems. RAID would provide predictive running estimates of the enemy situation. 
 Realistic experimentation and evaluation will drive the development process using human-in-the-loop, simulation-based 
wargames to compare humans and RAID in their adversarial reasoning capabilities. 
 
The overarching technical challenges of this problem include some of those we explored in the CADET, but also 
include others. There is a tight interdependence, coupling of blue and red actions. Blue knowledge of red assets and 
actions is inevitably limited. Observations as well as interpretations of the observations are subject to a significant 
degree of errors and latency. In addition to partial, delayed and often erroneous observations, the knowledge of the 
battlefield is limited by a purposeful, continuous, aggressive, intelligent concealment and deception. Due to cultural, 
doctrinal, and psychological effects, it is not enough to only consider the most dangerous (theoretically optimal to the 
enemy) course of action. The actual, most likely course of action can be affected by a broad range of “human factors” 
and be significantly different from the theoretically most advantageous one. Complex urban terrain offers a high density 
as well as a fragmentation of threats and opportunities for forces [7]. Further, the terrain itself is dynamic because it is 
continually modified by human actions (barricades in the stress, holes in the walls, etc.).The presence of non-
combatants on the battlefield must be explicitly considered and collateral damage minimized. Fire and maneuver of 
forces are not the only actions that must be carefully considered. Intelligence gathering, communications, and logistics 
(including casualty evacuation) are tightly coupled with fire and maneuver. The scale of the computational problem is 
immense and yet solutions must be generated in near real-time. 
 
The RAID program considered a number of technical approaches to overcoming the above mentioned challenges. None 
of them are without their difficulties. Examples include the following: 
 
 Game-theoretic and game-playing approaches: devising sequences of actions for both red and blue forces in 
a manner that assumes both sides strive to maximize the achievement of their respective objectives. Such 
approaches must pay special attention to the need for solving very large scale problems in near real time, 
recognizing the stochastic nature of outcomes for most moves, and addressing partial observability and 
deception issues. 
 
 Adversarial planning: forming plans for both red and blue actions that lead to the achievement of the 
respective desired goals while preventing the attainment of the goals of the other side; often using significant 
amounts of domain-specific knowledge. An important challenge in the application of such approaches is to 
make use of relatively few elements of domain-specific knowledge, as domain-independent as possible and 
easy to acquire, modify and manage. 
Figure 4:  Key components and technical approaches of the RAID program. 
  Deception discovery: analyzing the information state from a risk-sensitive perspective to determine which 
alternative hypotheses would benefit the enemy the most if accepted by the friendly forces; analyzing the 
significance of preconditions for the feasibility of alternative enemy courses of action to identify the one that 
are more likely to be the subject of deceptions; comparing earlier expectations with current evidence to find 
unexplainable deviations. Such approaches would have to find ways to deal with the complex, multi-
dimensional nature of the RAID problem; to work without the benefit of relying on significant amount of the 
human analyst’s input (if any), and cooperate with an adversarial reasoning component that may use a very 
different representational paradigm. 
 
 Pattern recognition: identifying patterns and anomalies in spatial and temporal locations, movements and 
other actions of the red force that could indicate concealment, deception and future intended courses of action; 
often using learning techniques to build and extend the repertoire of such patterns. Among the challenges 
relevant to such approaches are the need for effective generalization, especially in very complex terrain; the 
need to align pattern analysis with the enemy’s objectives and goals; and ways to prevent the red from using 
such pattern recognition means as an effective approach to deceiving the blue. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The demands of practical applications call for next generation of capabilities in adversarial reasoning. A broad, 
interdisciplinary field of study, adversarial reasoning includes belief and intent recognition, opponent's strategy 
prediction, plan recognition, deception discovery, deception planning, and strategy generation. From the engineering 
perspective, the applications of adversarial reasoning cover a broad range of practical problems: military planning and 
command, military and foreign intelligence, anti-terrorism and domestic security, law enforcement, information 
security, recreational strategy games, simulation and training systems, applied robotics. Recent years have seen a 
dramatic rise in capabilities of techniques relevant to adversarial reasoning, making potential solutions for the first time 
relevant to problems of practical scale and complexity. Many of the more fundamental challenges include the human 
(both individual and organizational) elements of adversarial reasoning: human beliefs, desires and emotions; human 
cognitive limitations and decision-making processes. 
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